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Abstract: In Foundations of Public Law, Martin Loughlin constructs an intricate conceptual 
triangle made up out of religion, law, and politics, in order to offer an account of the character 
of public law as a secular, political, jurisprudence. In this essay, I argue that this account takes 
neither religion nor law seriously - and this in revealingly similar ways.  
Loughlin’s book presents public law as an irreducibly paradoxical discourse, devoted to 
sustaining ‘the irreconcilable’ within society. Relative to this discourse, religion - understood by 
Loughlin as absolutist dogma - appears in the book only as a threat, whereas law - seen as a 
mere tool - becomes a necessary and innocent means for its support. I offer a critique of both 
these lines of argument, as not sufficiently attentive to religion and law as fields with their own 
histories, internal dynamics, and forms of efficacy. Religion, when seen in terms of practice, 
discipline, and ritual, in fact has much in common with - and considerable resources to offer to 
- Loughlin’s own vision of public law. And attention to the legalism so deeply embedded in 
juristic discourse reveals law as posing precisely the absolutist threat that Loughlin fears (but 
only associates with religion and ‘the social’).  
Bringing these two lines of argument together, I argue that Loughlin’s own ambition for 
public law as a prudential discourse of contained irreconcilability, is better served, not by 
striving for radical - and impossible - immanence, but by acknowledging that discourse’s dual 
character as a phenomenon both immanent and transcendent. I also suggest that ritual practice 
may have an important role to play in maintaining this dual, and paradoxical, character.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Public law, Martin Loughlin has long argued, is fundamental law. It is the law that 
institutes the sovereign. And in its modern liberal form, it is the law that sustains 
‘the autonomous world of the public sphere’.1 In ‘Foundations of Public Law’ 
Loughlin presents an intricate genealogical and conceptual account in which this 
modern public law emerges to answer questions of political theology by way of a 
‘political jurisprudence’. My argument in this essay is that this account does not 
take its own crucial strands of ‘religion’ and ‘law’ sufficiently seriously, in 
revealingly similar ways. The result, I claim, is a conception of public law that is 
radically immanent in a way that is unrealistic and that hurts rather than supports 
Loughlin’s own ambition for political jurisprudence as guarantor of ‘the 
irreconcilable’ within society.   
Three claims as to the character of modern public law, developed throughout 
the book, are central to this argument. First, Loughlin’s public law is a resolutely 
secular phenomenon. The book depicts the birth of an autonomous domain of the 
political as the outcome of a grand process of secularisation. In this, Loughlin 
broadly follows the radical account of a transition from ‘heteronomy’ to 
‘autonomy’ in Marcel Gauchet’s ‘The Disenchantment of the World’.2 In this story, the 
law sustaining political autonomy can evidently no longer be the religious 
fundamental law familiar to medieval jurists.3 Religion in modernity, Loughlin 
claims, merely ‘lives on as culture, and no longer as a basic structuring force of 
collective organization’.4 It is important to note even at this early stage that 
Loughlin adds a revealing coda to his secularisation story in his closing pages. 
There, he identifies a more recent threat to modern public law in terms of a ‘return 
of the religious’. This return, which is not dated with any precision, takes the form 
of the rise of ‘the social’, and is manifested in ‘overarching claims of the right and 
the true’, voiced, apparently, with growing fervour.5 
Second, public law is law. It is a form of ‘juristic’ discourse. This term is not 
defined in the book, but appears to refer to a familiar catalogue of what we might 
call legalistic characteristics and values. However, it is also clear that if public law is 
to remain fundamental in any meaningful sense, it cannot merely encompass the 
bare ‘lex’ of posited law. And so instead, Loughlin argues, modern public law takes 
a distinctive politico-juridical form: that of ‘a prudential discourse of political 
right’. This is public law as political jurisprudence: as ‘droit politique’ (in Rousseau’s 
term), or as ‘the jus of lex’ (in Oakeshott’s).  
                                                      
1 M. Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) hereafter FPL, 10, 232. 
2 M. Gauchet, The Disenchantment of the World (O. Burge, trans.) (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1997). 
3 Cf. FPL, 158 (seeing this as ‘axiomatic’) 
4 FPL, 8. 
5 FPL, 465. 
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And third, most importantly, public law is ‘unresolvable confrontation’ - in its 
form, function, and aspiration.6 The book’s central concern is to recover and 
maintain public law as a form of discourse through which a range of enduring 
central dilemmas over ‘matters of common existence’ can be expressed and 
negotiated, but through which also, crucially, their reconciliation or elimination 
can be forever deferred.7 Loughlin sees these dilemmas as all related to a 
supposedly universal ‘disjuncture between freedom and belonging’.8 But more 
important - and more easily defended - than the precise substance of any specific 
binary opposition identified, I would argue, is the overall character of his 
undertaking, as committed to recognising and safeguarding public law’s irreducibly 
paradoxical logic and its essential openness and open-endedness.9 Public law thus 
contains conflict, in the double sense of the verb ‘to contain’.10 Borrowing an 
expression from Hent de Vries, it is what allows us to ‘dwell in contradiction’, 
together.11 
In this essay, I ask three broad questions with regard to these dimensions to 
the character of public law and their relationship to each other. First, if political 
jurisprudence is indeed, as Loughlin puts it, a ‘kind of secularized natural law’, 
then how exactly is it secular?12 Second, if public law is to be a ‘juristic discourse’ 
sustained by ‘lawyers and legal modes of thinking’, but if it is, at the same time, 
threatened by positive law and excesses of ‘legalism’, then in what ways exactly is 
political jurisprudence still law?13 And third, most importantly: if political 
jurisprudence does indeed both require and facilitate a lasting commitment to 
openness, to contradiction, and to ‘unresolvability’, are the chances of sustaining 
public law’s paradoxical logic in fact best supported by insisting on its secular and 
juristic qualities in the way Loughlin frames them? 
                                                      
6 FPL, 465. 
7 E.g. FPL, 156 (quite literally ‘forever’: see the reference to ‘perpetual conflict’). Safeguarding this 
essential openness to contradiction is Loughlin’s only explicitly identified normative commitment (see 
at 13). Having framed his argument as - predominantly - an exercise in retrieval and reconstruction, 
Loughlin tells us almost nothing - at least in this work - about the connections between his notion of 
‘unresolvable confrontation’ and broadly similar ideas in normative political philosophy, such as, most 
importantly, Rawls’ overlapping consensus (for a brief allusion, see at 365). These possible linkages will 
also remain outside the scope of this response. I should note, though, that some of the work drawn on 
below in support of a critique of Loughlin - in particular that of the anthropologist Talal Asad and the 
political theorist William E. Connolly - is also, explicitly or implicitly, critical of Rawls. See further 
William E. Connolly, Why I Am Not A Secularist (University of Minnesota Press: 1999). 
8 FPL, 11, 13. 
9 Cf. Jean-Pierre Dupuy, The Mark of the Sacred (Stanford: 2003), 17. Positing the ‘universality’ of any 
particular binary simply imposes at a meta-level a form of precisely the absolutism that Loughlin seeks 
to avoid. 
10 This emphasis on the double meaning of the verb is taken from Jean-Pierre Dupuy and Louis Dumont. 
See Dupuy (2003), 5. 
11 Hent de Vries, ‘On General and Divine Economy: Talal Asad’s Genealogy of the Secular and 
Emmanuel Levinas’s Critique of Capitalism, Colonialism, and Money’, in: David Scott & Charles 
Hirshkind (eds.), Powers of the Secular: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors (Stanford: 2005), 131. See also 
Marcel Gauchet, ‘Tocqueville’, in: Mark Lilla (ed.), New French Thought: Political Philosophy 91 (Princeton: 
1994), 103 (‘the existence of the irreconcilable within society’). 
12 FPL, 231. 
13 FPL, 308. 
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The argument offered in response starts from the claim that in his focus on 
retrieving and defending the autonomous and foundational character of public law 
in the modern age - after religion and against mere positive law, as it were - 
Loughlin does not take either religion or law sufficiently seriously. This is to say 
that he does not treat them as discourses and fields with their own histories and 
practices, internal dynamics and forms of efficacy. Ironically, it is precisely because 
Loughlin develops such a richly nuanced understanding of the politico-
jurisprudential as a discursive modality - the register of a ‘prudential discourse of 
political right’ -, that the book’s essentialising take on what are, at least to some 
extent, two parallel registers - of the religious and of the juridical - is so striking.14 
The main reason for this flattening gaze may be that although both religion and 
law are assigned important, even crucial, roles in the narrative of ‘Foundations of 
Public Law’, these roles remain highly specific and circumscribed. This is where the 
relation to the third dimension of political jurisprudence noted above - its positive 
embrace of ‘unresolvability’ - becomes important. In more general terms, the 
principal danger to the vitality of paradoxes and of reflexive or dialectical 
relationships has to be some externally imposed form of closure. The main such 
threats of closure Loughlin identifies stem from what we might call two types of 
fundamentalism. There is, first, the more ‘formal’ fundamentalism of an 
exclusively positivistic and legalistic understanding of public law.15 And second, 
there is the more ‘substantive’ fundamentalism of absolutist religious ideas and 
values, and more recently, the perfectionism of what Loughlin calls ‘the social’. 
Loughlin’s public law, as the ‘the ineffable idea of the jus of lex’, then, must 
continuously resist attempts at re-grounding through either a ‘purely formalistic 
notion’ of law or through the ‘importation of substantive values derived from 
natural law’.16  
Intriguingly, it may well be that these two fundamentalist challenges, of 
legalism and value-absolutism, are related, and also that they are both of particular 
salience in the present moment.17 In a 2009 article, the anthropologist John 
Comaroff observed a ‘simultaneous fetishism of the law and the assertive rise of 
religiosity in the age of neo-liberalism’.18 Part of what Comaroff means is that 
recent decades of intense juridification - of constitution-writing, of international 
human rights litigation, of investment arbitration, and so on - have also been a 
period of an increased significance of religious formations in the public sphere, 
notably in places like the United States, West- and North-Africa and the Middle 
                                                      
14 ‘Modality’ is used here in the basic sense of a mode of engagement with the world. Cf. Adam B. 
Seligman, Robert P. Weller, Michael J. Puett & Bennett Simon, Ritual and its Consequences: An Essay on 
the Limits of Sincerity (Oxford: 2008), x. 
15 FPL, 297. 
16 FPL, 232. 
17 These parallels and possible relationships between positivism and value-absolutism are not addressed 
explicitly in the book. Nevertheless, in my view it is one of the achievements of Loughlin’s work to 
furnish examples of these parallel movements and to stimulate reflection on their relationship. See also 
below, fn. [20]. 
18 John Comaroff, Reflections on the Rise of Legal Theology: Law and Religion in the Twenty-First Century, 53(1) 
SOCIAL ANALYSIS 193, 194ff (2009). 
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East.19 Comaroff also suggests, however, that these are not merely parallel 
movements, but that we are in fact witnessing different forms of the ‘mutual 
infusion of law and religion’. ‘Pace Carl Schmitt’, he argues in response, ‘it is not 
just about political theology that we ought to be vexing ourselves. It is also about 
legal theology’.20 One question motivating my commentary on Loughlin’s work is 
whether taking ‘legal theology’ seriously, as the encounters and analogies, clashes 
and parallels, between the religious and the juridical, is something that ‘Foundations 
of Public Law’ does. My sense is that it does not. Rather, in his effort to answer a 
problem cast as political theology by way of political jurisprudence, it is not just religion, 
or law, but legal-, or juridical theology that becomes the missing leg in Loughlin’s 
genealogical and conceptual triangles.  
These parallel critiques of Loughlin’s constricted views of religion and law, 
and of his neglect of their intertwined existence in juridical theology, occupy 
Sections II and III of this essay. Section IV then goes on to argue that the 
insistence on the secular and juridical character of political jurisprudence are, in 
fact, merely two aspects of a more general assertion of public law’s autonomy, or 
more precisely: its immanence. Immanence is used here in the sense of Weber’s 
‘Eigengesetzlichkeit’ - as the ‘internal and lawful autonomy’, of different spheres of 
life.21 Religion, when understood as absolute, comprehensive exteriority - 
‘heteronomy’, in Gauchet’s terminology - threatens this autonomy. The juridical, 
taken as an instrument available for appropriation, supports it, while any danger 
posed by its own formal absolutism is seen as a threat that can be contained. 
Against this background, this Section discusses two related areas of difficulty.  
The first concerns the idea of immanence itself.22 This theme arises because, 
in spite of the - perhaps partly polemical - emphasis on purely immanent logics in 
‘Foundations of Public Law’, the character of droit politique as actually developed in the 
book does in fact rely on various forms of exterior authority, heteronomy, or 
indeed: transcendence. Key examples are the given-ness of language, shared 
conceptions of past and future, and especially, as described earlier, the character of 
the juridical form. These elements are in need of recognition and exploration. Not 
least because they offer suggestive parallels to some of the work Loughlin 
                                                      
19 Comaroff, ibid. 
20 Ibid. Another way of capturing these parallel turns towards religion (and the assertion of religious 
identities in particular) and towards law, is by seeing both as part of an ‘overwhelming concern with 
sincerity’ that marks our age; with ‘sincerity’ understood as a ‘concern with “authenticity,” with 
individual choice,’ and by the projection of a ‘totalistic, unambiguous vision of reality “as it really is.” 
See Seligman et al. (2008), 8-9, 42, 118, 122-124 (emphasis in original); and further Section 4, below. A 
third, similar, diagnosis is offered by Alain Supiot, who decries the simultaneous phenomena of a 
‘flood of individual rights’ (somewhat confusingly called ‘legal nihilism’), and ‘religious fanaticism’ as 
two sides of the same ‘temptation of fundamentalism’. See Alain Supiot, Homo Juridicus (Verso: 2007), 
xxi, xxv. These three perspectives - of legal theology, sincerity, and fundamentalism - differ in 
important ways, but they also share similar themes. 
21 Charles Wright Mills & Hans Heinrich Gerth (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1958), 328. 
22 FPL uses both ‘transcendence’ and ‘exteriority’, apparently as synonyms. ‘Heteronomy’ is used by 
Gauchet, but does not figure in FPL, despite the centrality of ‘autonomy’ to the book’s argument.  
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examines in his reconstruction of political jurisprudence, notably the writings of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 
The second area of difficulty concerns the relationship between immanence 
and irreconcilability as twin aspects of the character of political jurisprudence. On 
this point, I argue that Loughlin’s rigid insistence on the immanent character of 
public law, in the end, undermines rather than strengthens the possibility of 
sustaining the kind of contained conflict he strives for. This argument draws 
together the understanding of religion presented in Section II, with an extension 
of Loughlin’s own emphasis on paradox and ineffability, and it contains two 
claims. The first is that ritual may have an important role to play in safeguarding 
openness and contradiction. This may be counter-intuitive. Ritual, after all, is often 
associated rather with formalism, dogma, and cohesion. But recent 
anthropological work emphasises how ritualised action can also help defer closure 
and counteract the fundamentalism that comes with the ‘drive to wholeness’.23 
Through ritualised action, these anthropologists suggest, ‘absolutes’ imposed from 
outside, can be replaced with ‘shared subjunctives’ construed partly from within. 
More specifically, and this is my second claim, it is through such forms of acting 
that individuals and collectives may be able to construct and maintain vital pockets 
of ‘in-betweenness’.24 This is space - mostly metaphorical and discursive, 
sometimes actual - that belongs neither entirely to the social, nor fully to any 
individual. Such sites can never be comprehensively occupied or represented by 
any person, any group, or by society itself. This means that, from the perspective 
of both individuals and the collective, they offer an empty space that appears as 
simultaneously immanent and transcendent. They are islands, in other words, of 
transcendence-within-immanence. 
This emphasis on the significance of these themes, of ‘unoccupiability’, 
‘inbetweenness’, and ritual, finally, suggests two important possibilities that 
‘Foundations of Public Law’ does not admit. First, that the religious may not be a 
mere absolutist threat to public law, but could also, through its links to 
ritualisation, be supportive of public law’s requisite open-endedness.25 And 
second, conversely, that the perils of legalism, so deeply embedded within the 
discursive modality of the juridical, may be far more difficult to contain than 




                                                      
23 Cf. Connolly (1999), 141, 143; Seligman et al. (2008). See further Section 4. 
24 See further Section 4.  
25 As should become clear below, this is a very different argument from the well-known claims developed 
by Tocqueville, Ernst Bockenforde, Robert Bellah, and others, on religion as a guarantor of social 
cohesion. 
 




II. TAKING RELIGION SERIOUSLY: POLITICAL JURISPRUDENCE AS 
SECULAR 
 
In ‘Foundations of Public Law’, religion is both utterly central and curiously absent. 
The same is true for law, as I will argue in the next Section. These parallel 
absences have important implications for what Loughlin is able to say about the 
character of public law as a secular prudential discourse of political right. 
Religion’s centrality, first, is perhaps most immediately noticeable in the way 
the work of the French philosopher Marcel Gauchet quite literally bookends 
Loughlin’s argument.26 It is Gauchet’s grand narrative of the ‘disenchantment of 
the world’ that Loughlin turns to for an account of the dynamics of differentiation 
and separation said to underpin the emergence of an autonomous domain of the 
political.27 Gauchet also furnishes the timing of the relevant decisive historical 
change in outlook, with his claim that after 1700 the ‘age of religion as a 
structuring force’ of collective organisation ‘is over’.28 More generally, Loughlin’s 
thesis of a recent ‘return of the religious, albeit in a different form’ has a clear 
analogue in a depiction Gauchet offers, in his work on Tocqueville, of a twentieth-
century ‘return of the religious principle’, as ‘the full and entire reconciliation of 
society to a predetermined truth’ under totalitarianism.29 Most importantly, 
Gauchet’s identification of a fundamental incompatibility between ‘religion’ and 
‘democracy’ provides the template for the character of political jurisprudence 
itself. Religion, for Gauchet, means appeals to ‘the external’ and ‘the absolute’ as 
sources of authority - precisely the transcendence and the fundamentalism that 
Loughlin rejects. Democracy, in stark contrast, enables and organizes ‘the 
existence of the irreconcilable within society’.30 Loughlin’s public law, as noted 
before, then becomes the prudential public discourse that assures this essential 
unresolvability.  
My claim in this Section is that by following Gauchet so closely, Loughlin 
commits himself to a historical and philosophical perspective that does not take 
religion seriously, in three related senses of that phrase.31  
First, since Gauchet’s original publication - and more particularly, during the 
decade or so leading up to Loughlin’s book - there has been a sustained attack on 
the ‘easy assumption’ that public life today is ‘basically secular’.32 This has been an 
                                                      
26 E.g. FPL 6-7; 48; 63; 84;103; 465. 
27 FPL, 6-7; 63. 
28 FPL, 48. 
29 FPL, 465; Gauchet, Tocqueville (1994), 106. 
30 Ibid., 103, 108 (‘The radical originality of democratic society ... is always to question itself’); FPL, 465. 
31 See further Sarah Shortall, Lost in Translation: Religion and the Writing of History, 13 MODERN 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 273 (2016). 
32 Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, Jonathan Vanantwerpen, ‘Introduction’, in: Craig Calhoun, Mark 
Juergensmeyer & Jonathan Vanantwerpen (eds.), Rethinking Secularism (Oxford: 2011), 3; Winnifred 
Fallers Sullivan, Robert A. Yelle, Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, ‘Introduction’, in: Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, 
Robert A. Yelle & Mateo Taussig-Rubbo (eds.), After Secular Law (Stanford: 2011, 1); Martin 
Riesebrodt, Fundamentalism and the Resurgence of Religion, 47 NUMEN (2000), 266-287. 
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extended scholarly moment of ‘searching critique’ for ‘long-accepted discourses of 
modernity and enchantment’, as well as for the teleological paradigms on which 
these tend to rest.33 Traditional periodisations - the idea of an ‘enchanted’ middle 
ages and the notion of a ‘decisive cultural rupture’ at the end of the 17th Century - 
as well as the conceptual vocabulary of ‘secularization’, ‘secularism’, and ‘the 
secular’ have all come to be seen as much less stable than assumed previously.34 
Loughlin, however, continues to rely on a version of the classical narrative that is 
now among the most radical in the field, subscribing fully to the teleology of ‘a 
progressive and thorough modern secularization’ of law.35 In ‘Foundations of Public 
Law’, history moves forward ‘because of God’s withdrawal’ from ‘a secularizing 
world’. And secularisation is a broadly coherent project, propelled by jurists 
actively ‘undertaking’ a ‘transition to modernity’.36  
Second, religion figures in ‘Foundations of Public Law’ in some sense as a 
‘transhistorical constant’ - as ‘an independent variable that affects other aspects of 
human life while itself eluding historical change’.37 This constancy is not 
immediately obvious. After all, religion disappears in an important sense in 
Louglin’s account, only to resurface again ‘in a different guise’, later in modernity. 
But this narrative still incorporates an understanding in which, first, religion’s role 
appears to be largely unchanging during the long period of its initial reign, and in 
which, second, there exists in fact some identifiable, deeper, underlying religious 
element that is capable of resurrection in some recognisable sense, even after a 
long period of absence. For the first part of this story, the long period of pre- and 
early-modernity, the book tells us virtually nothing about religion’s character, 
content, form, or modes of efficacy, apart from the abovementioned references to 
‘the absolute other’ as a form of authority. Religion, for Loughlin and Gauchet, as 
for Kant and Schmitt, is theology; and theology is dogma.38 But this abstract and 
                                                      
33 Michael Saler, Modernity and Enchantment: A Historiographic Review, 111 THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL 
REVIEW 692 (2006), 700; Alexandra Walsham, The Reformation and “The Disenchantment of the World” 
Reassessed, 51 THE HISTORICAL JOURNAL 497 (2008), 504, 528. 
34 Ibid. See also Fallers Sullivan et al. (2011), 2; Calhoun et al. (2011), 3 (‘Until quite recently, it was 
commonly assumed that public life was basically secular’); Walsham (2008), 499 (‘In recent years ... the 
notion that the Reformation was a powerful catalyst of the “disenchantment of the world” has been 
seriously questioned and qualified’). 
35 FPL, 84, 63. Gauchet’s theory has been described as ‘the only modern theory of secularization’ to posit 
the ‘disappearance’ of religion. See Philip Gorski, Historicizing the Secularization Debate: Church, State, and 
Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe, ca. 1300 to 1700, 65(1) AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL 
REVIEW 138, 141 (2000). This is even taking into account his concession of the survival of religion in 
‘the personal sphere’, or as Loughlin puts it with a different emphasis, ‘as culture’. Fallers Sullivan et al. 
(2011), 9. Note: In this respect, it is striking how much more Loughlin tells us about the historical 
settings in which his protagonists were writing than about the immediate context for his own theory. 
What Loughlin offers us is a theory of public law heavily invested in the idea of a secular, autonomous 
public sphere, at precisely the time when the notion of the ‘demarcation’ of religion from such a 
sphere, both as a historical occurrence and a present-day phenomenon, is increasingly uncertain. 
36 Cf. FPL, 84. 
37 Shortall (2016), 275. This theme is central to the work of Talal Asad. See, e.g., his Genealogies of Religion 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press: 1993). 
38 Cf. Graham Hammill, ‘Blumenberg and Schmitt on the Rhetoric of Political Theology’, in: Graham 
Hammill & Julia Reinard Lupton (eds.), Political Theology and Early Modernity (Chicago: 2012), 87 
(referring to Schmitt’s discussion of Erik Peterson’s 1925 essay ‘What is Theology?’, in his Political 
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timeless conception cannot do justice to religion as a historical phenomenon. It 
can explain neither its earlier capabilities as a ‘structuring force’, nor why and how 
this efficacy would have been lost. It does not account for any variation in 
religious doctrines and practices or in their significance to individual and collective 
life.39 For the later part of the story, there is a second consideration, which is that 
if religion is to remain potent as a threat today, as Loughlin claims that it does, 
then it has to be ‘more than just the obsolete vestige of a distant past’.40 There 
apparently is, in other words, something underneath religion’s changing 
appearance - ‘the religious’ - that is granted ‘a transhistorical status that is denied 
to other historical formations - in particular social and political ones’.41 In a sense, 
this is a case of taking religion too seriously, by according it, as James Chappel has 
put it, ‘a special reprieve from history’.42 This ‘transhistorical constant’ view of 
religion is commonly associated with the work of Alexis de Tocqueville. It is a 
view that is often criticised for its - explicit or implicit - attribution, to religion, of a 
positive, socially integrative force.43 Tocqueville himself famously wondered 
‘whether man can ever support at the same time complete religious independence 
and entire political freedom’, and was drawn to the conclusion that ‘if a man is 
without faith, he must serve someone and if he is free, he must believe’.44 
Loughlin and Gauchet, of course, draw the diametrically opposite conclusion: that 
true political freedom comes only with religion’s demise, and the transition from 
transcendence to immanence - from heteronomy to Kantian autonomy, from an 
‘ordre subi’, in Gauchet’s terms, to an ‘ordre voulu’.45  
The structural parallel between these two positions prompts a third, related, 
critique: that ‘Foundations of Public Law’ ignores the internal dynamics and 
ambiguities within the field of religion, as well as the difficulties of imposing any 
clear boundary between religious and non-religious phenomena. In the world of 
‘Foundations of Public Law’, it is always possible to identify an idea, a practice, or a 
                                                                                                                                         
Theology II. See also Gauchet, Tocqueville (1994), at 98-99 (‘intellectual constraint’ coming from ‘a body 
of dogmatic beliefs sheltered from the disputes of experience’). 
39 Note: Where Gauchet writes of the central importance of the development of ‘the State’, he means to 
refer not just to the development of nation States in Western-Europe that Loughlin has in mind, but 
also to the very first instances of public administration, found around 3000 B.C. See, e.g., Marcel 
Gauchet, Le Désenchantement du Monde (1985), at 20 (‘l’emergence de l’Etat ... comme l’evenement majeur de 
l’histoire humaine’, refers to ‘quelque part autour de 3000 avant J.-C. en Mesopotamie et en Egypte’, see 22). See 
also 21: ‘cinquante siècles de politique contre la religion’). For criticism, see also Martin Riesebrodt: ‘by placing 
the seeds of secularization into the rise of the early empires, secularization becomes the logical 
outcome of the reconfiguration of religion as soon as the paradise of “primeval” society is lost’ (Martin 
Riesebrodt, Book Review, in ASJ 1999, 1526). 
40 Cf. Shortall (2016), 279 (discussing opposite, but structurally identical, claims as to religion’s continued 
relevance). 
41 Ibid. For this perspective see, e.g., FPL, 19 (raising the question of ‘to what extent to religious and 
symbolic impulses ... continue to permeate our subject?’; describing ‘theological questions’ in abstract 
terms as ‘driven by an appeal to the power of the One, and the need to mediate both between the 
visible and the invisible, and between the temporal and the eternal’; and remarking that ‘the extent to 
which these impulses live on in the guise of new beliefs and representation remains in question today’). 
42 Cited in Shortall (2016), 275. 
43 Ibid.  (discussing the work of Brad Gregory). 
44 Tocqueville, 2.I.5, p. 512. 
45 Gauchet, Le Désenchantement du Monde (1985), 15. 
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form - most broadly: a discourse - as ‘religious’ or not. The same goes for the 
identification of discourses as ‘juristic’, on which more below. But precisely what it 
is that makes a discourse ‘religious’ - or ‘juristic’ - is nowhere explained. And any 
attempt at such an explanation is bound to run into serious difficulty. To begin 
with, recent historiographical scholarship has emphasised striking instances of the 
‘heteronomous intellectual practices of the early modern period’.46 This work 
effectively undermines the notion of any clear historical and conceptual break - a 
‘great separation’ - between ostensibly secular discourses of politics and law on the 
one hand and religion on the other, during that time.47 Of special relevance for 
Loughlin’s genealogy in this regard are the writings of Thomas Hobbes. For 
Hobbes, in a nuanced reappraisal by the historian Jonathan Sheehan, ‘“theology” 
and “law” were equally potent schemes for thinking [the] containment’ of the 
commonwealth, and its preservation in the face of disorder and disintegration.48 
Even more fundamentally, what emerges from this reassessment, as Sheehan 
explains, is that ‘theology, like politics, is not an essence, but a set of claims that 
appear in time’.49 This idea, that religious utterances and symbols ‘cannot be 
understood independently of their historical relations with nonreligious symbols or 
of their articulations in and of social life’, is central to the work of the 
anthropologist Talal Asad.50 In his well-known critique of Clifford Geertz’s 
symbolic approach to religion, Asad has called for attention to the ‘authorizing 
processes’, of power and discipline, by which religious meaning is constructed in 
the world.51 ‘[T]he theoretical search for an essence of religion’, Asad writes, 
‘invites us to separate it conceptually from the domain of power’.52 And it is 
through power, in a wide range of forms - including worldly and ecclesiastical 
laws, sanctions, and the disciplinary activities of social institutions and of 
individual bodies - that in Asad’s view, ‘“religion” is created’.53 Even if one does 
not accept this critique in its most stringent version, it is easy to see how attention 
to the diverse range of processes by which religious meanings are created is bound 
to throw up all kinds of difficult boundary questions. Questions, that simple 
binary oppositions - between religion as a powerful structuring force of collective 
organisation and religion as mere culture, or between religion as domesticated 
culture and religion as recurrent threat - cannot adequately address. 
 
 
                                                      
46 Jonathan Sheehan, ‘Assenting to the Law: Sacrifice and Punishment at the Dawn of Secularism’, in 
Fallers Sullivan et al. (2011), 73. 
47 For the term ‘the great separation’, see Mark Lilla, The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West 
(New York: Knopf, 2007). 
48  Sheehan (2011), 73. See also Walsham (2008), 511 (‘English monarchs continued to be seen as 
conduits of thaumaturgic power’). 
49 Sheehan (2011), 77.  
50 Asad, ‘The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category’, in Genealogies of Religion: Discipline 
and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 53-54. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., 29. 
53 Ibid., 37.  
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AUTONOMY AND AMBIVALENCE 
  
Two main reasons animate this extended discussion of the position of religion in 
‘Foundations of Public Law’, and of the book’s position in the wider contemporary 
landscape of secularisation scholarship. I should emphasize that these go beyond 
highlighting the disjunction in Loughlin’s work between, on the one hand, an 
acknowledgment of the fuzziness of any boundaries between the medieval and the 
modern, or the sacral and the secular, and, on the other, the centrality of precisely 
such a break, in conceptual terms, for his overall project.54 They concern rather, 
first: the possibilities for a historicised and comparative understanding of the idea 
of ‘autonomy’ in general, in order to better grasp the notion of autonomy of the 
political more specifically; and, second: the appreciation of the irreducibly 
ambivalent character of religious phenomena, in contrast to the one-dimensional 
emphasis on the-absolute-as-constraint, emphasised by Gauchet and Loughlin. 
First, as mentioned earlier, Loughlin is deeply invested in the idea of 
autonomy for the public sphere. That autonomy is closely interwoven with - 
supported by and generative of - a highly distinctive and similarly autonomous 
notion of specifically political power. Now, one thing Asad’s work does is to show 
how historiographical and conceptual questions concerning the elaboration of this 
political autonomy find important parallels in the construction of an analogous 
autonomy for religion. Religion itself, in other words, comes to be included in the 
list of domains for which the construction of their - relative - autonomy needs to 
be interrogated. That perspective is radically different from the classical 
differentiation account, followed by Loughlin, in which religion figures merely as a 
background out of which modern specialised domains, like literature or art or 
science, and of course politics, emerge.55 The relevant shared question is succinctly 
raised by the editors of a collection on ‘Political Theology and Early Modernity’, which 
appeared around the same time as Loughlin’s book. ‘How does politics remain 
distinct from the content and practices of ethics, economics, and culture, while 
nonetheless bearing on them’, these editors ask, ‘and how does politics share this 
difference with religion’?56 By casting religion merely as shackles to be thrown off, 
Gauchet, and following him, Loughlin, foreclose an important avenue for 
exploring precisely this type of question. For the editors of the political theology 
collection, ‘grasping what is distinctive’ about religion and, in their example, art, as 
‘forms of human expression’ requires ‘some kind of formal and phenomenological 
accounting’.57 This kind of formal analysis of course lies at the heart of ‘Foundations 
of Public Law’, and Loughlin’s own earlier ‘The Idea of Public Law’. Curiously, 
however, this approach only extends to the domain and the discourse of political 
                                                      
54 See, e.g., FPL, 17. 
55 See, e.g., FPL, 7. 
56 Hammill & Reinhard Lupton (2012), 4 (emphasis added). 
57 Ibid., 6. For a similar perspective, see Shortall (2016), 284 (calling for ‘an appreciation of the way in 
which religious discourses interact with, but are not exhausted by, the political, social, and cultural 
contexts of their production’). 
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jurisprudence; not to religion, nor, as I will claim below, to law. But attending 
more carefully to the way religious phenomena come to be authorised as religious, 
as well as to the roles of power and discipline in the construction of the category 
of ‘religion’ and the differentiation of the domain of ‘the religious’, is bound to be 
significant for a project so invested in a parallel autonomy for the political.58 
Without such a comparative and relational approach, it will be difficult to move 
beyond mere assertions of differences between a ‘secularization of power’ and a 
‘transfusion of sacrality into politics’, for example, or between divine grace as 
‘bolstering’ as opposed to ‘creating’ a sovereign’s status.59 And our understanding 
of the idea of ‘autonomy’ is likely to remain ahistorical and importantly 
incomplete.60 
Second, there is the problematic association of religion with the idea of the 
absolute. It is important to re-emphasise that the secularisation narrative described 
earlier has a central role to play in Loughlin’s story. Secularisation and secularism 
render necessary, enable, and ultimately determine the character of, an anti-
foundationalist conception of the foundations of public law. Secularisation 
provides the narrative in which the reign of absolute values, externally imposed, is 
replaced by a public discourse in which everything is always and continually up for 
prudential revision in a debate among equal participants. On this view, then, 
religion can only ever be understood as the absolute and the external - the ‘absolute 
other’ in Gauchet’s phrase.61 And religious power only ever works to constrain, as 
opposed to the rules of public law, which always simultaneously, and 
paradoxically, both enable and restrict.62  
This story, however, ignores a diametrically opposite view of religious 
discourses and their social efficacy. Like Loughlin’s and Gauchet’s account, this 
alternative view has its roots in both history and philosophy. But instead of a one-
sided emphasis on religion as constraint, this view stresses rather ‘the irreducibly 
ambiguous ways in which religious discourses operate historically, at once 
constraining and enabling their subjects’.63 Adopting a historical understanding of 
theology ‘not as a passive entity or thing, but dynamic process’, this view 
emphasises that ‘ambivalence and contradiction’, doctrinal tension and 
disagreement, ‘should not be regarded as anomalies but normalities’.64 On this 
reading, any association between religion and absolutism becomes contingent 
rather than necessary, certainly as a matter of history. Going further, the 
                                                      
58 Also because it will show how ‘political’ forces have long been bounded up with the demarcation of 
‘religious’ spheres. See, e.g., Walsham (2008), 522 (noting, for example, how ‘political, rather than 
intellectual, forces’ were significant in provoking a ‘loss of credibility’ for demonology and witchcraft 
during the early-modern period). 
59 For a more detailed discussion of examples of such ‘migrations of the holy’, see Walsham (2008), esp. 
at 111ff. 
60 See FPL, 39 for these references. 
61 Gauchet, Tocqueville (1994) 108. 
62 See, e.g., FPL 178. E.g. Gauchet, Tocqueville (1994), 110 (religion as ‘ultimate limits’). 
63 Shortall (2016), 281. See also 275 (noting ‘he political ambivalence of religious phenomena: the way 
they function as sites of empowerment as well as constraint, and inclusion as well as exclusion’). 
64 Walsham (2008), 527. 
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philosopher of religion Hent de Vries has argued that what he calls ‘dwelling in 
contradiction’ - and what Loughlin might call living with, or in, paradox - ‘is the 
“modality” of the spiritual life, the religion of adults’. Now, whether, with de 
Vries, one sees this kind of radical openness as the core characteristic of religion - 
‘always and everywhere’ -, or whether one adopts a more moderate view, allowing 
at least as much room for contradiction as one does for dogma, and for 
empowerment as for constraint; in both cases, any equation of religion with the 
absolute dissolves. In fact, on the more moderate view, religion, as both enabling 
and limiting, as pushing towards universality and as a ‘destructuring movement 
away from unity’, comes to resemble very closely the character of political 
jurisprudence as described by Loughlin. The religious, like the political - even as an 
inflection of the political, perhaps -65 rather becomes available as one more resource, 
conceptually and historically, for developing precisely the kind of prudential 
discourse for life lived in common, in contradiction, that Loughlin cares about.  
 
 
III. TAKING LEGALISM SERIOUSLY: POLITICAL JURISPRUDENCE AS LAW 
 
The notion that political jurisprudence, as a ‘prudential discourse of political right’, 
must be a juristic discourse, is as central to Loughlin’s account as the idea that 
public law must be a secular phenomenon. But what is it, precisely, that makes a 
discourse ‘juristic’? What, in other words, makes public law, law? That, in 
‘Foundations of Public Law’, is far less clear. This is not for want of invocation of the 
appropriate terms. The autonomy of the public sphere, Loughlin says, is ‘sustained 
by its own politico-legal norms and practices’.66 These norms and practices - droit 
politique - form a ‘singular type of juristic discourse’.67 Its vision of the ‘right-
ordering of public life’ is a juristic concept’.68 It obeys to a ‘juristic logic’ and offers 
a ‘juristic frame’ for political judgment.69 It cannot, of course, be the aim of this 
Section to restate or clarify what Loughlin means by ‘public law’ in the broader 
sense of ‘Recht’ or ‘droit’, as elucidated by Hegel and Rousseau, and so many other 
writers in the long Western tradition that ‘flourished from the late-sixteenth to the 
early-nineteenth centuries’.70 That, after all, is what ‘Foundations of Public Law’, as a 
whole, is about. What I am rather concerned with here is the insistence that this 
tradition is concerned with ‘a category of juristic thought’.71 Especially because 
Loughlin is equally insistent that the vitality and significance of this category of 
thought depend entirely on it also being something else, something more, than just 
positive law.72  
                                                      
65 De Vries, On General and Divine Economy (2005), 131. 
66 FPL, 86-87. 
67 FPL, 231. 
68 FPL, 159 (in an account of ‘authority’). 
69 FPL, 237, 400. 
70 FPL 9; 111ff (on Rousseau).  
71 FPL, 9. 
72 Among many instances, see, e.g., 237 (discussing Heller). 
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These terms - ‘juristic’, and ‘legal’, in particular - are nowhere defined. As was 
the case with ‘religion’ in the previous Section, and again in marked contrast to the 
great care taken to elaborate the character of droit politique itself, the identification 
of phenomena as ‘juristic’, and of actors as ‘jurists’, is simply taken as given. The 
book does, however, offer a number of indirect, partial answers. Juristic, to begin 
with, references a ‘rationalist commitment’.73 Law brings with it ideas of order and 
regularity, often by analogy with laws of nature, and a sense of ‘scientific discipline’.74 It 
is associated with the Hobbesian idea of ‘command’.75 Juristic accounts are 
concerned with the constitution of authority.76 They are normative, in that they are 
not merely backward-looking historical investigations, but are concerned also, at 
least in part, with ideals. But juristic also carries the meaning of practical, in the 
sense that law is dynamic, but also in the sense that juristic accounts are concerned, 
at least in part, with social reality, rather than merely operating on the level of 
political philosophy or morality.77 Juristic, finally, also appears as a simple 
shorthand for secular. 
We get a particularly clear idea of the kinds of commitments involved in the 
adoption of a juristic frame, in Loughlin’s discussion of Tocqueville’s views on the 
role of lawyers in American democracy. For Tocqueville, lawyers, by their training, 
acquire ‘certain habits of order, a taste for formalities, and a kind of instinctive 
regard for the regular connection of ideas, which naturally render them very 
hostile to the revolutionary spirit and the unreflecting passions of the multitude’.78 
‘Without this admixture of lawyer-like sobriety with the democratic principle’, 
Tocqueville continues, ‘I question whether democratic institutions could long be 
maintained’.79 These passages, both quoted in ‘Foundations of Public Law’ raise two 
rather different questions. The first, to be discussed only briefly here, concerns the 
tension between, on the one hand, the book’s embrace of these limits on 
democracy set by ‘lawyers and legal modes of thinking’, and, on the other, its 
forceful rejection of apparently very similar limits on the ‘political world’ set by the 
‘spirit of religion’ that Tocqueville also sees as indispensable.80 Here, it seems 
Loughlin could offer at least two defences. He might argue, first, that this 
inconsistency is only apparent, since the boundaries set by ‘lawyers and legal 
modes of thinking’ operate on the level of ‘culture’, and his account fully accepts 
that religion ‘lives on as culture’ in modernity, even when it has lost its efficacy as 
a ‘structuring force’ in society. In part for the reasons discussed in the previous 
Section, however, I do not think this binary distinction between ‘mere culture’ and 
something supposedly altogether more foundational can be maintained. 
                                                      
73 FPL, 98, 307. 
74 FPL, 110, 73. 
75 FPL, 88. 
76 FPL, 159. 
77 FPL 112 (in contrast with pure political philosophy). 
78 Cited in FPL, at 307. 
79 Ibid. 
80 FPL 308-310; Tocqueville, Democracy in America (G.E. Bevan, trans.) (London, Penguin Books, 2003), 
55-56. 
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Alternatively, Loughlin might say that the two kinds of boundaries are 
fundamentally different in that the juristic is entirely immanent, whereas the 
religious relies on some form of transcendence. This argument, and the 
understandings of immanence and transcendence it depends on, will be taken up 
in the next Section.  
What I want to focus on here is a second question raised by Loughlin’s 
embrace of Tocqueville’s view of law and lawyers. This is the question of the 
prospects for a political jurisprudence that is able, in the longer run, to capture the 
benefits of the juristic form, without falling prey to the legalism that constitutes 
the flip side of that very form. Loughlin’s invocation of law, it should be 
emphasised, is entirely instrumental. The ‘form of law’ is what invests the political 
discourse of right ordering ‘with rational form, i.e. with universality and 
determinacy’, so as to become the opposite of mere individual ‘subjective 
conviction’.81 But while political jurisprudence relies on this juristic form, it is 
simultaneously threatened by ‘legalism’ and ‘the triumph of ordinary law’.82 I am 
much less certain than Loughlin appears to be, however, that these dangers can be 
kept at bay. Does not invoking law - the juridical form, the authority of lawyers - 
mean that we get all of law? This, I would argue, is what taking law seriously, as a 
form and as a discursive field with its own internal dynamics, suggests. Loughlin’s 
discussion of the State shows this very clearly. The concept of the State, Loughlin 
argues, ‘is the entity that gives us access to the nature of modern political reality 
and provides the key to understanding the nature of public law. It forms a scheme 
of intelligibility (...)’.83 But of course, as Loughlin also recognises, this scheme 
itself, this ‘comprehensive way of seeing, understanding, and acting in the world’, 
is itself an intellectual construct, of a very particular kind.84 And as Pierre Bourdieu 
writes, it must be ‘impossible to give a genealogy of Western society without 
bringing in the determining role of jurists brought up on Roman law, capable of 
producing this fictio juris (...). The state is a legal fiction, produced by lawyers who 
produce themselves as lawyers by producing the state’.85 The way these lawyers 
have created this fiction - and, with it, themselves as a professional class, as 
recognised also by Tocqueville - is through what Bourdieu calls ‘the imposition of 
form’.86 That form, for all Loughlin’s protestations that ‘law’ here should refer to 
‘public law’ in his broader sense, is the Western legalist form, of ruleness and 
autonomousness. And that form also, whether for political, social, or metaphysical 
reasons, has a force of its own. A force that, as the anthropologist Harry Walker 
argues in recent work, often ‘exceeds people’s capacities to manage or control it’. 
‘Like magical power, it surpasses the intentionality of even the most potent 
                                                      
81 FPL, 148, quoting Hegel. 
82 FPL, 297. 
83 FPL, 208. 
84 FPL, ibid. 
85 Pierre Bourdieu, On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992 (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2014), 
55. 
86 Ibid., 57ff. 
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practitioners’.87 Loughlin’s instrumental invocations of the juridical form do not 
take these fetishistic qualities into account.88 If law is invoked to rationalize and 
stabilise a political discourse meant to remain prudential, its form will also push 
towards closure. If law is relied on to maintain a political discourse meant to 
remain open and diverse, the juridical form will also impose centralisation.89 Even if 
the conceptual vocabulary of law is invoked because, after the supposed demise of 
religion, we have no other words left to express the kind of amalgam intended, of 
rationality, universalism, normativity, authority, etc., we have to realise that this 
juristic vocabulary is not innocent.90  
In closing this Section, it is necessary to acknowledge one last issue, which 
bears on the consistency between the perspective adopted here, on law, and the 
one developed in the previous Section, on religion. This is the question of whether 
‘juristic’ and its cognate concepts and terms will have meant roughly the same 
thing to all the actors on the long historical arc traced in Loughlin’s book. Is 
arguing that the juristic form will bring with it certain inherent tendencies that may 
overwhelm both individual and collective actors not akin to adopting the 
‘historical constant’ view criticised earlier for religion? This is a difficult question, 
and one that cannot be fully answered here. It does seem at least plausible, 
however, that law and religion are different on this point, at least in the Western 
tradition.91 This is because the long arc of that tradition is itself built around, and 
constantly propagates, the idea of law as a historically constant form. The notions 
of law as a ‘self-sustaining system of rules defined by reason’; of the legal order as 
‘separate and specialized technique of governing social relations’; and of legal 
science as ‘an analytical approach to power and its rational normalization’; all have 
their foundation in Roman law.92 These were all notions that Loughlin’s 
protagonists were familiar with; they often in fact invoked Roman law legal terms 
for these very qualities. And so, the danger that references to historical actors as a 
‘jurist’, or to historical sources as law (lex) will be a-historical, therefore, seems 
considerably smaller than the corresponding danger for references to, say, the 
authority of an early-Modern monarch as being ‘secular’ in nature.93  
 
                                                      
87 Harry Walker, Justice and the Dark Arts: Law and Shamanism in Amazonia, 117(1) AMERICAN 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 47, 55 (2015). The argument here is not that no individual jurist can master all of 
law, but rather that invoking legal forms may bring consequences that surpass the intentionality of legal 
practitioners, both individually and collectively.  
88 Cf. Walker (2015); Comaroff (2009); Christopher Tomlins & John Comaroff, “Law As ...”: Theory and 
Practice in Legal History, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1039 (2011). 
89 Walker (2015), 55. 
90 It is noteworthy, finally, that the basic question of why Loughlin’s protagonists of political 
jurisprudence turned to law at all is never raised or answered in FPL. Compare in this regard, Ian 
Williams’s recent observations in his review of Daniel Lee’s Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern 
Constitutional Thought: ‘[A]n important question was begged and never addressed: why use legal material, 
language and ideas at all? Not all early-modern theorists did. Did legal material determine the issues 
raised and conclusions reached, or was it used instrumentally, justifying conclusions reached (or 
sought) for other reasons?’. See 80(2) MODERN LAW REVIEW 382. 
91 But for an important caveat, see Tomlins & Comaroff (2011), 1069. 
92 See Aldo Schiavone, The Invention of Law in the West (Harvard University Press, 2012), 11, 13, 12. 
93 Ibid., 201. 
 




IV. TAKING EXTERIORITY AND IRRECONCILABILITY SERIOUSLY:  
RITUAL AND THE ‘IN-BETWEEN’ 
 
Loughlin, then, presents political jurisprudence as a resolutely immanent 
phenomenon - a discourse free from any form of exteriority. Medieval 
government may have ‘received its authority from transcendent source’. But the 
authority of modern government is firmly ‘located in immanent necessities’.94 The 
break between these two perspectives, for Loughlin, following Gauchet, is what 
constitutes ‘the deepest ever fracture in history’.95 Throughout this essay, I have 
sought to argue that such a categorical distinction, between immanence and 
transcendence, cannot be maintained. Section II questioned the idea that the 
religious is entirely outside or above the control of individuals and collectives, 
notwithstanding Gauchet’s and Loughlin’s strident portrayal of ‘the essence of 
religious thought’ as ‘the external’ and ‘the unchangeable’.96 As historiographical 
and anthropological work shows, religion is simply too enmeshed with different 
forms of power and discipline to be understood as entirely transcendent in such a 
sense. Section III, in turn, sought to cast doubt on the idea that law, even when 
‘acknowledged to be a human construct’, is entirely within human control.97 Law’s 
hypostatised character and its fetish-like qualities render such pure immanence 
implausible.  
Both religion and law, rather, appear as phenomena that are ‘neither 
completely autonomous, nor completely constructed’.98 Taken together, these 
discussions of religion and law in fact suggest that, at least for such domains of 
individual-making, collective-making, and meaning-making, it may be impossible to 
draw any general distinction between immanence and transcendence in the first 
place.99 Once identified, this basic ambivalence turns out to pervade other 
elements of Loughlin’s account of public law as well. The role played by language 
in Foundations is a good example. Recall that, for Loughlin, the discourse of 
political right is ‘a language’ needed for communication over matters of common 
existence. Loughlin links this formulation to Charles Taylor’s similar notion of the 
need for a language to sustain a ‘common space of evaluation’ among 
individuals.100 Taylor importantly argues that such a language cannot belong to any 
one individual speaker - it must, as he writes, be ‘our language’. And as such, he 
concludes, it ‘has to be constituted by conversation between us’.101 This is surely a 
major insight, as Loughlin also acknowledges. But it does not fully capture the 
                                                      
94 FPL, 7. 
95 Ibid., cit. Gauchet (1997), 28, 55. For the original French, see Gauchet (1985), 83-84, 157. 
96 cf. FPL, 6-7. 
97 FPL, 7. 
98 Bruno Latour, On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods (Durham NC, Duke University Press, 2011), 8. 
99 Cf. ibid., 28. 
100 FPL, 155. 
101 Charles Taylor, Hegel’s Ambiguous Legacy for Modern Liberalism (1988) 10 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 865, 
cited in FPL, at 155. 
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extent to which such a language, its terms and its structures, will also already have 
to exist prior to any particular conversation.102 Rather than being a purely 
immanent phenomenon, then, language combines all these elements in itself - of 
agency, both individual and collective, but also of heteronomy, or transcendence, 
as something both ‘within us’ and ‘outside us’.103  
The same basic ambivalence that is central to the character of religion, of law, 
and of language generally, I want to suggest, also marks the character of the special 
language of political right. While the rules of the grammar for this language are 
indeed, as Loughlin writes, ‘rules that we have devised’, that cannot be all they 
are.104 The discourse of public law as political jurisprudence is something we have 
built, but also that goes beyond us.105 That political jurisprudence may indeed be 
best understood in such a paradoxical, dual sense is suggested by the work of the 
originator of the term droit politique: Jean-Jacques Rousseau. When Rousseau writes 
‘il faudroit [sic] des Dieux pour donner des loix aux hommes’,106 he is not signalling some 
manifest impossibility, as perhaps suggested more strongly by his other famous 
aphorism, that placing ‘law over man’ would be akin to attempts to ‘square a 
circle’.107 Instead, Rousseau goes into great detail to set out the requisite qualities 
of his Legislator as a figure straddling the immanence-transcendence boundary.108 
In one especially revealing formulation, Rousseau writes that for a people to come 
to be truly ruled by law it would be necessary that ‘l’effet pût devenir la cause’: ‘that 
men should be before the law, what they are to become by the law’.109 This is 
precisely the kind of paradoxical and reflexive dynamic that Loughlin emphasises 
throughout Foundations, as part of the distinctiveness of political jurisprudence. But 
the fact that the reversal of cause and effect that Rousseau invokes is a signature 
characteristic of the logic of fetishisation, suggests that more is involved here than 
the fully immanent idea of ‘reflexivity’ that Loughlin invokes.110 Instead, I would 
argue, following Jean-Pierre Dupuy, that what Rousseau’s work demonstrates is 
the uncanny ability of human societies to ‘produce their own exteriority’.111 These 
                                                      
102 For a broad statement to this effect, see Supiot, Homo Juridicus (2007), 7 (‘We are all subject to the 
heteronomy of language. It constitutes the condition of any discussion and thus cannot itself be 
debated’). See also FPL, 31 (on the role of Latin). 
103 See Roy Rappaport, Ritual, Religion and the Making of Humanity (Cambridge: 1997), 49 (citing Stanley 
Tambiah). See also Bourdieu, On the State (2014), 45 (on language as a ‘repository of social philosophy’). 
104 Cf. FPL, 178. 
105 Cf. Latour (2011), 16. 
106 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du Contrat Social (1762), II, 7 (Oeuvres Complètes La Pléiade III, 381). 
107 FPL, 132. 
108 Contrat Social, II, 7; OCP III, 383 (‘Ainsi lʼon trouve à la fois dans lʼouvrage de la Législation deux choses qui 
semblent incompatibles: une entreprise au-dessus de la force humaine, & pour lʼexécuter, une autorité qui nʼest rien’.). 
See for a subtle characterisation of the ‘volonté générale’ as ‘à la fois immanent et transcendent’, Lucien Scubla, 
‘Est-il Possible de Mettre la Loi au dessus de l’Home? Sur la philosophie politique de Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’, in Jean-Pierre Dupuy (ed.): Introduction aux Sciences Sociales (Ellipses: 1998), 131. For Scubla, 
the general will is based on a ‘common interest’, formed through the simultaneous exclusion of all 
individual interests - a common interest, therefore, at once within and outside all citizens, rather than 
some generalised aggregation of all their individual preferences (ibid.). 
109 Contrat Social, II, 7; OCP III, 383. See also Scubla (1998), 134. Own translation, emphasis added. 
110 Cf. Bourdieu, On the State (2014) 32; FPL 12, and many other instances. 
111 Dupuy (2013), 2. 
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are forms of projected exteriority, however, that are essentially ambivalent: they 
involve forms of ‘self-exteriorization’, or, in Dupuy’s terms, ‘self-
transcendence’.112  
One way of framing this argument is as a simple extension of Loughlin’s own 
approach. If paradox lies at the very foundations of the public sphere, why would 
this same feature not also constitute that sphere as simultaneously immanent and 
transcendent, with boundaries at once firm and permeable, determinative of its 
identity and endlessly to be negotiated? We can also put this the other way around: 
It could well be that this reflexive and ambivalent conception of the relations 
between the register of political jurisprudence and alternative modalities, offers the 
best chance of securing the kind of commitment to openness and paradox that 
Loughlin seeks to maintain within public law. And so, the questions we should be 
asking would be the following. First, if some form of exteriority is unavoidable, is 
there any way to think through its character as something that is fundamentally 
different from the ideas of ‘the absolute’ and ‘the unchangeable’ decried by 
Loughlin? And second, if there is a way to conceive of exteriority in such a way, 
what does this mean for the character of public law and our approach to its 
understanding? The answers I would like to suggest to these questions - in the 
form of and ‘ritual’ and the ‘in-between’ - are developed, tentatively, in the 
remainder of this Section.  
 
RITUAL AND ‘IN-BETWEEN’ SPACES 
 
The project, then, is to take Loughlin’s search for a discourse of public law that 
can ward of any form of absolutisation in the public sphere largely on its own terms, 
with the friendly amendment that the role of contradiction and ambivalence 
should be extended to the boundaries of that sphere itself. What would be the 
characteristics of such a discourse?  
It seems that certain conceptions of ritual and ritualisation are particularly 
well suited to the kind of engagement with irreconcilability that Loughlin 
envisages. This argument begins with a view of ritual as one particular ‘modality’ 
of engagement with the world, rather than any ‘discrete realm’ of action.113 That, I 
would suggest, may also be the most productive way of thinking about public law 
(as well as about law more generally, and religion, but this is beyond the scope of 
this paper). At least on some views, one important characteristic of the modality of 
ritual - and of the practice of ritualisation - is that, using an unavoidably ugly term, 
it ‘precises ambiguities, it neither overcomes them nor relaxes them’.114 As the 
authors of ‘Ritual and its Consequences’, a collective essay written around the time of 
Loughlin’s book, argue, ‘the ritual mode has a built-in ability to abide with the 
inevitable ambiguities of life, even within an equally inevitable impulse toward an 
                                                      
112 Ibid., 9, 15. 
113 Seligman et al. (2008), x. 
114 Ibid., 7, citing Jonathan Z. Smith. 
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ever delayed - yet also never abandoned, desire for wholeness and totality’.115 What 
makes this suggestion especially interesting is the fact that these authors appear to 
share a diagnosis of a cultural, political, and social climate of around the turn of 
the 21st century, that seems close to the one animating Loughlin’s exercise to 
retrieve a lost discourse for the prudential negotiation of the tensions of common 
existence. ‘The reaction to the cultural and economic forces of globalisation, the 
re-emergence of religious commitments and ethnic identities throughout the 
world’, these authors argue, ‘all suggest the failure of our existing cultural 
resources to deal with ambiguity, ambivalences, and the gentle play of boundaries 
that require both their existence and their transcendence’.116 Ritual preserves and 
emphasises ambiguities and tensions, such as those between tradition and 
innovation, between agency and submission, between different roles of 
individuals, and between the individual and the collective. The ritual mode is able 
to achieve such states of “dwelling in contradiction” through the creation of 
‘shared subjunctives’. These are ‘as if’ worlds’ of ‘social convention and authority 
beyond the inner will of any individual’.117 For the authors of ‘Ritual and its 
Consequences’, ‘what constitutes society - what makes the social a sui generis entity, 
irreducible to any other - is (...) a shared “could be”, the ‘mutual illusion of the sort 
that all rituals create’.118 It is important to note that this ‘subjunctively shared 
arena’ is a ‘space in between. It is not a place where individual entities dissolve into a 
collective oneness’, of the kind Durkheim designated through his notion of 
‘effervescence’.119  
This last point is important in relation to the other question raised earlier, of 
how to understand exteriority in a way that sustains rather than abrogates 
productive tension and contradiction. Recall that Loughlin defines ‘the social’, as a 
principal danger to the vitality of political jurisprudence, as absolute and 
comprehensive claims of the right and the true. Such overriding claims, of course, 
do feature prominently in contemporary public discourse, and they may well be on 
the rise, as Loughlin suspects. Here, however, is a portrayal of ‘the social’ in terms 
of a shared ‘could be’: as the diametrical opposite of any ‘totalistic, unambiguous 
vision of reality “as it really is”’.120 This, in other words, is ‘the social’ as tentative, 
fragmented, and always provisional, rather than in any sense ‘absolute’, or 
‘unchanging’. An alternative form of exteriority now also comes into view. What 
political jurisprudence - through ritual - may be able to do, I would suggest, is to 
actively construct, by way of a shared imagination, a kind of transcendence-within-
                                                      
115 Ibid., 112; See also at xi (‘a unique way of accommodating the broken and often ambivalent nature of 
our world’. Other writers in anthropology who have also highlighted connections between ritualisation 
and ambivalence and contradiction include Victor Turner and Vincent Crapanzano. For a general 
discussion, see Catherine Bell, Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions (Oxford: 2009), 39-40, and 57. For a 
normative defence of a political philosophy with very similar features, see Connolly, Why I am Not a 
Secularist (1999).  
116 Ibid., 10. 
117 Ibid., 7, 11, 20. 
118 Ibid., 23. 
119 Ibid., 26 (emphasis added). 
120 Ibid., 8. 
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immanence: a space that ‘belongs neither to the self nor the other’; neither to the 
individual, nor to the collective.121 These ‘in-between’ spaces are public law’s 
exteriority within itself. And their constitutive feature is precisely that they are not 
marked by any definite substantive content, person, or group, but by a form of 
absence. What political jurisprudence sustains and protects, then, are pockets of 
emptiness: ‘in-between’ spaces that cannot be occupied by any individual speaker, or 
by any set of substantive values, and that cannot be entirely subjected to rules, or 
legislated away.122   
Further development of the character of these ‘in-between’ spaces, and their 
logics of un-occupiability and un-representability, has to remain beyond the scope 
of this essay.123 For now, a helpful analogy can be found in the way ritual liturgies 
are similarly able to instil shared experiences of ‘time out of time’. These are 
intervals during which one form of time - ‘sacred’ time, or ‘festival’ time, for 
example - is marked off from, moves differently from, but also remains dependent 
on, ‘ordinary time’.124 During such periods of transcendence-within-immanence, 
contradictions can be played out rather than definitely resolved. This is also how I 
would characterise the space for confrontation opened up, ideally, in political 
jurisprudence. It is also worth noting that these themes find resonance in broader 
anthropological, historical and philosophical writing.125 Take for instance, this 
interpretation of the famous ‘empty throne’ of the Ashanti in the work of the 
anthropologist A.M. Hocart: ‘[F]or a limited time the chief of state will occupy an 
inviolable place. Like the king of the Ashanti, who sits under [his throne] because 
no one can sit on it, he will be, so to speak, placed under the protection of the 
general will, without at all being able to identify himself with it. [He is] neither 
supreme leader, nor representative of the sovereign, but guardian of an empty place 
from which no one can talk because no one can occupy it’.126 Loughlin himself, in his 
essay on ‘The Constitutional Imagination’ cites Claude Lefort’s depiction of the ‘locus 
of power’ in modern government as ‘an empty place’.127 This is a form of 
emptiness that remains after, in Loughlin’s words, ‘the transcendent figure of the 
sovereign is effaced’.128 If I understand him correctly, Loughlin would see his 
project as the elaboration of a form of public law that is able to ‘fill’ this modern 
‘vacuum’; though, crucially, without any resort to exteriority or absolutes. As he 
describes the challenge: ‘It may indeed be empty, but the place remains’.129 But 
                                                      
121 Cf. Ibid., 50. 
122 Cf. Ibid., 180 (referring to ‘pockets of order’). 
123 For a rich, normative account of a political philosophy with such features, see again Connolly (1999). 
124 Cf. Rapaport (1997), 216. 
125 Notably in Hermann Heller’s idea of an ethical foundation to law which ‘has content, though one 
which is not prescribed by any particular philosophy or ideology’. See David Dyzenhaus, Hermann 
Heller and the Legitimacy of Legality (1996) OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 651. See also De 
Vries, General and Divine Economy (2005), 132. 
126 Scubla (1998), cited in Dupuy (2013), 149. 
127 Martin Loughlin, The Constitutional Imagination (2015) MODERN LAW REVIEW 11; also in Dupuy (2013), 
148 
128 Loughlin, ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
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would it not be more in keeping with Loughlin’s own arguments to argue that it is 
rather maintaining these spaces as empty ground, protecting them against 
occupation and forever deferring their dissolution, that constitutes the task for 





There are no foundations, Loughlin tells us in ‘Foundations of Public Law’. It is droit 
politique all the way down. There is fundamental law, but there cannot be any 
fundamentalism. Public law’s purpose is precisely to prevent, by postponing 
indefinitely, any kind of grounding in absolutes. It can only do this if it can 
safeguard its own fundamental-ness. Doing that, Loughlin argues, requires an 
immanent discourse of irreconcilability.130  
On the first point, I have argued that given Loughlin’s general outlook of 
favouring openness and paradox, the categorical affirmation that public law has to 
be entirely immanent is incongruous. If the ‘radical originality of democratic 
society’ really is ‘always to question itself’,131 should this questioning not also be 
extended to the way the boundaries of the discourse of political right are 
conceived?132 And so, instead of the pursuit of an impossible radical immanence, 
we may do better trying to understand political jurisprudence as generative of, and 
supported by, a highly particular kind of exteriority: an un-occupiable, in-between 
space for public discourse that is simultaneously, and from different perspectives, 
transcendent and immanent. 
On the second issue, I have claimed that the concern to safeguard 
irreducibility and to prevent the elimination or reconciliation of the vital 
contradictions of living together, may draw support from the practices of ritual. 
Ritualised modes of acting may be uniquely well-suited to a world where identities 
and boundaries are in need of both constant affirmation and transgression, so as 
to both allow for their existence and to guard against their absolutisation. 
Ritualisation is also an appropriate frame for understanding the kind of reflexivity 
that Loughlin places at the heart of political jurisprudence. It offers an 
understanding of dynamics through which men and women can be made before 
law what they ought to become through law. Ritual, after all, is often a key site for 
                                                      
130 In this essay, I have taken Loughlin’s objective of assuring irreconcilability through public law on its 
own terms. I have not discussed possible objections to that overall project, such as that the discourse 
of public law construes an abstract concept of a public sphere rather than any actual, genuinely open 
sphere itself; or the idea that speaking of public law reveals more about the speakers than about what is 
spoken of (cf. Asad (1993) 40; Bell (2009), 4; cf. Bourdieu (2014), 28, on the ‘divinization effect’ of 
neutrality).  
131 Cf. Gauchet, Tocqueville (1994), 108. 
132 Cf. Connolly (1999), 5-8, 19-46. 
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the construction of both normality and of normativity, and for dialectical 
movement between the two.133 
This turn towards ritual has important implications for the study and the 
practice of public law as political jurisprudence. For one, it sits somewhat uneasily 
with Loughlin’s own turn towards symbolism in his more recent work on ‘The 
Constitutional Imagination’.134 The strands of anthropological work he draws on 
there, notably the symbolic anthropology of Clifford Geertz, have been criticised 
for assuming and emphasising forms of coherence and harmony of ideas that are 
difficult to reconcile with Loughlin’s own arguments in support of 
contradiction.135 Apart from Geertz’s insights, then, further work on the discourse 
and the practice of political jurisprudence might draw on other anthropological 
work, such as that by Edmund Leach on the ‘grammar’ of ritual, or by Talal Asad - 
cited earlier - on practice and discipline.136  
Most importantly, the ritualisation perspective serves as a useful reminder 
that negotiating the tensions of common life requires effort. ‘Ritual is endless 
work’, it has been said, ‘but it is among the most important things we humans 
do’.137 Much the same could be said of our efforts to maintain a genuinely open 
register of public reason, in the form of a prudential discourse of political right. 
That discourse, though, as I have argued, may have to be somewhat more like 



















                                                      
133 The game analogy in David Dyzenhaus’s discussion of Heller is illustrative for its closeness to ritual 
dynamics. See Dyzenhaus (1996), 654. 
134 Loughlin (2015). Note that FPL despite its explicit mentions of the importance of ‘practice’ in fact 
offers very little discussion of any such practices, apart from some mention of early coronation rituals. 
135 Cf. Bell (2009), 28-30; Asad (1993). 
136 Cf. Bell (2009), 68, 79. 
137 Seligman et al. (2008), 182. 
